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Underutilisation of labour is rightly regarded as one of
the most serious and difficult problems facing the
world today. Not all economies however, are equally
affected by it. Some - whether as a result of mineral
resource endowment or of favourable labour/land
ratios - are grappling with the opposite problem of
labour shortage. This article considers three such
'labour shortage' economies: Brunei, Sabah and
Sarawak. Each of them are oil producers. But the oil
sector has had a somewhat different role in each
economy and has contributed differently to the
emergence of a shortage of labour. The article is in
three sections: the first defines the concept of labour
shortage; the second describes its incidence in each
state; the third examines some policy solutions.
Definitions of Labour Shortage
The condition of labour shortage requires careful
definition. Perhaps the simplest way to approach it is
through its antithesis: labour surplus. In a classic
labour-surplus economy, as described by Lewis
(1954), the existence in the subsistence sector of
workers of 'negligible, zero or even negative' marginal
productivity makes available to the capitalist sector an
unlimited supply of labour at a constant real wage.
However, this phase of unlimited supply lasts only as
long as marginal productivity of workers in the
subsistence sector is zero. Once this removable labour
surplus is exhausted, the supply curve of labour to the
capitalist sector turns upwards. On the weakest
definition of labour shortage (as the absence of labour
surplus) it might be deemed to exist if the capitalist
sector's demand curve for labour cuts the supply curve
at a point where the supply curve is upward-sloping.
Thus in the modified Lewis diagram of Figure 1, if the
demand curve is D1 there is a labour surplus, if D2 a
labour shortage.
A test for the existence of labour shortage in this sense
might be the progress of real wages over time.
Persistent, strong upward movement of real wages
would be consistent with such labour shortage
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Figure J
Demand for and Supply of Labour in the Capitalist
Sector - a Weak Definition of Labour Shortage
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although there might be other explanations for it, such
as minimum wage legislation, trade union organi-
sation, or increases in the cost of transfer from the
subsistence to the capitalist sector.
However, on this definition a large number of
economies might be judged to have a labour shortage.
Something stronger is needed. Labour shortage might
be taken to imply not only that employers must
increase their wages if they want to add to their labour
force, but also that they are wilting to employ, at the
existing real wage, more workers than are currently
employed and willing to work at that wage. In theory,
provided the wage level is free to equilibrate demand
and supply, persistent shortage of labour manifest
in a high level of vacancies at current wage levels
should occur only during short 'adjustment'
periods. Thus, a sustained high level of vacancies for
unskilled labour would normally be associated with
constraints preventing the emergence of a market-
clearing wage. In Figure 2, for example, if the wage
were prevented from rising from W1 to W2, the
market-clearing level, a shortage of workers manifest
by vacancies equivalent to L1L2 would persist. Under
this interpretation, then, if the meaning of 'shortage' is
to be non-trivial (i.e. not synonymous with 'scarce') it
would occur endemically only if wages were not free to
adjust upwards in response to an increase in demand.
Figure 2:
Wage-induced labour shortage
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Under some market conditions, however, labour
shortage, defined as above, could occur without
delivering sustained upward pressure upon the real
wage. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Thus, at wage OW
employers would be willing to employ 0L2 workers.
However, at this wage only OL1 workers offer
themselves for employment, implying a gap between
maximum demand and supply of L1L2. It can be seen
that this shortage will not be resolved by market-
determined movements of the real wage.
This situation, of course, implies an unusual shape for
the marginal product of labour curve, from which the
demand curve is derived. However, a 'kinked'
marginal product curve is possible in cases where, at
the margin, employers' actions have no impact upon
the market price of their product, and where fixed
capital is a negligible proportion of total costs. This
can be so, for example, where the price of an export
good is fixed in terms of foreign exchange, and where
the main factor inputs are land, labour and variable
Figure 3:
'Endemic' labour shortage in the capitalist sector
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capital. These conditions are approximated in the
production of some types of agricultural exports. Thus
in estate agriculture, provided there is no land
constraint, the marginal product of labour could
effectively be constant over a fairly large range of
output values. It will be shown that the above analytic
tools are helpful in attempting to understand the
nature of labour shortage in the three economies in
question.
Shortage of labour in an economy does not necessarily
imply an absence of underutilisation. Indeed, the more
frequent and intensive the shortage, the greater the
internal labour slack. Also, shortage of labour in one
sector of an economy may coexist with and be
aggravated by underutilisation in another sector; thus
even in market economies, over-expanded government
services sectors may starve productive sectors of
workers. It may be wrong to describe these
phenomena as problems, since some are fairly easily
resolvable. But different means of resolving them have
different consequences, and they often raise quite
complex problems of policy.
Labour Shortage in the Three Economies
Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak are situated in the
northern part of the island of Borneo, which they
share with the Indonesian provinces of West, Central,
South and East Kalimantan to the South. Brunei is a
sultanate which gained full independence from Britain
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at the end of 1983. Sabah and Sarawak are states
within the Federation of Malaysia, but separate
labour markets to the extent that they require work
passes of other Malaysians as well as of foreigners
working within their borders. Each of these economies
is affected by shortage of labour, but for different
reasons. These will be discussed in turn.
The Brunei economy, with a population in 1985 of
around 225,000 people, is dominated by the
production of oil and gas. This sector accounts for
90 per cent of GDP and 95 per cent of government
revenue (Table 1). The oil/gas sector itself employs
only a small proportion (about five per cent) of the
active labour force. Although a large proportion of
Brunei's oil revenue is invested overseas (the income
from which, together with current oil/gas production,
has helped to provide Brunei with one of the highest
levels of income per capita in the world) enough is
spent at home to generate a chronic shortage of
labour. One aspect of this is the very high rate of
formation of capital, mostly in the form of buildings
and infrastructure, the construction of which reached
a peak during the run up to independence. The other
substantial non-oil sectors are retail trade and
Table 1
Comparative Data: Economies of North Borneo, Circa 1980
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banking, finance, insurance, real estate and business
services.
However, the most important aspect of the domestic
spending of oil revenues is the expansion of the civil
service, to the extent that in 1981 the public sector
absorbed 47 per cent of all employees and as many as
76 per cent of Brunei citizen employees. Further, it
accounted for 44 per cent of non-oil GDP. As a result
of its dominance, the public sector appears to set the
supply price of labour to the rest of the economy. This
does not necessarily mean that government wages are
always higher than those in the private sector at every
level. Nevertheless the government is the wage leader
in the dynamic sense of being the employer in relation
to whom other employers set their wage levels.
Citizens prefer the status and security of a government
job and the government establishment is allowed to
expand to absorb those who want such jobs. The
private sector, under pressure to employ more citizens,
has to raise its wages to bid them away.
The general situation of labour shortage does not
mean that unemployment is completely unknown.
The 1981 census revealed an unemployment rate
Sabah Sarawak Brunei
Population 1,100,000 1,500,000 200,000
of whom: non-citizens 245,000 7,000 50,000
GDP growth 1970-80 (p.a.) (%) 10 13 12
% of GDP from: agriculture 11 7 0.5
forestry 28 16 0.1
oil and gas 12 30 90
% of Government revenue from: oil and gas 20 45 95
Savings as % of GDP 40 50 70
Capital Formation as % of GDP 25 28 40
Active labour force: citizen 250,000 460,000 43,000
non-citizen 100,000 6,000 24,010
% in agriculture 58 53
oil and gas 0.7 0.7 5
forestry 3 5 -
government 19 15 47
Citizen government employees as % of total citizen employees 26 15 75
Unemployment rate 8 5 5'
Female participation rate 43 51 30
Note: ' The rate is negligible for males, but around 10% for females
Sources: Population censuses, National accounts and authors' estimates
among citizens of over five per cent. This mainly
affects females. The rate for males, at less than
three per cent, is hardly more than frictional, but
lOper cent of the female citizen labour force are
unemployed. This in turn reflects the virtual doubling
of the female participation rate over the ten years to
1981, reflecting significant increases in real wages over
the period. Alongside and aggravating labour
shortage, also, there is massive underutilisation of
labour in another sense. It would be possible to
remove a large number of people from their current
activities. This removable labour surplus [what Sen
(1975:36) calls the 'production aspect' of underutili-
sation] is usually found in agriculture but in Brunei's
case it is located in the bureaucracy.
Thus, the non-oil sectors of the Brunei economy are
high wage service sectors. As in some other previously
agricultural oil-producing economies suffering from
'Dutch Disease', agriculture has withered away, and
manufacturing has been stifled under the impact of a
high real exchange rate induced by oil revenues. High
real wages in services plus domestic labour shortage
largely explain this situation. It implies, however, that
the constraints preventing long-term diversification of
production away from dependence on oil are
exceedingly difficult to overcome.
The other two economies are far less dominated by oil
and gas production than is Brunei. In the case of
Sabah, this sector accounts for 12 per cent of GDP and
around 20 per cent of government revenue. Equally,
although the proportion of the labour force working
in agriculture has been falling over the past few years,
at 58 per cent in 1980 it was still fairly high. So too is
the proportion of the workforce represented by own-
account and unpaid family workers (44 per cent in
1980 compared with 55 per cent ten years earlier), a
sign of the continued importance of the small holding
sectors. Thus the economic structure, and the
composition of employment are much less dominated
by oil, and more strongly focused upon agricultural
production than is the case in Brunei.
There is, however, a shortage of labour in the formal
sector. The major cause is the low ratio of labour to
cultivable land. Overall population density is less than
14 per sq km, and even density per sq km of land of
moderate nd high agricultural potential is only 46
persons, compared with 87 in Peninsular Malaysia,
165 in the Philippines and 630 in Bangladesh. By no
means all of the population, however, are eligible to
hold land. The Chinese Malays, who comprise about
one quarter of the population, and the immigrant
groups (comprising a further quarter) are ineligible for
the receipt of a 15-acre smallholding which is the right
of Bumiputera households. Thus, the other cause of
labour shortage has been the rapid growth of the
formal economy over the past decade, led by the
extractive sector. Formal employment growth has
been more than sufficient to absorb the available
labour supply from both indigenous and non-
indigenous groups, causing an acute labour shortage
- particularly in the construction and agricultural
estates sectors.
The shortage of labour has been aggravated by the
expansion of the public sector, though again not to the
same extent as in Brunei. Having grown at an annual
average rate of over six per cent since 1969, the public
sector employed over 66,000 people in 1983,
equivalent to about 40 per cent of all employees
outside the smallholder agricultural sector. Part of this
growth has been due to the creation of statutory
bodies in productive sectors of the economy (a
strategy which has not been particularly successful)
but these account for only about 15 per cent of total
public sector employment.
Although large, the government can hardly be said to
dominate the local labour market. Basic salaries are
fixed by the federal government and, although a
regional allowance is also paid, this has perhaps
prevented public-sector salaries from rising as high as
they otherwise would have during the oil and timber-
based boom of the l970s. Large manufacturing firms
appear to pay considerably more than government to
all grades of workers, and statutory bodies which are
tied to government salary scales have difficulty in
attracting and retaining the scarce manpower that
they need. Although smaller firms pay slightly below
government scales for most categories, the government
does not seem to be the wage leader in the dynamic
sense that the Brunei government is.
As in Brunei, shortage of labour coexists with various
forms of underutilisation. On the normal international
definition ('not working' and 'seeking work') the
unemployment rate revealed by the 1980 census, at
3.0 per cent, is quite low. If the 'seeking work' criterion
is relaxed (as it arguably should be, particularly in
rural areas where it does not make much sense to seek
non-existent wage employment) the rate rises to
7.9 per cent. Females, particularly in rural areas
(where their unemployment rate on this definition is
10.5 per cent) are disproportionately affected. So too,
according to the 1980 Labour Force Survey, are the
young (the unemployment rate for the 15-19 age group
is 25.4 per cent), the relatively well educated
(particularly those with lower and middle secondary
schooling) and new entrants to the labour force
(70.9 per cent of the unemployed have never worked
before). Thus, there are mismatches here (by gender,
age, education and training and geographical area)
but there also seems to be an element of search
unemployment, as those with higher levels of
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education take time to adjust to the deterioration in
their labour market prospects that has accompanied
educational expansion.
The case of Sarawak is similar to Sabah, but somewhat
more complex. Demand for and supply of labour are
here more evenly balanced - although at present
shortages of unskilled labour predominate. The oil
sector is proportionately more important than in
Sabah - yet remains small in comparison with Brunei
(30 per cent of GDP, 45 per cent of government
revenue). Nevertheless output and employment
growth in the formal sector has, as in Sabah, been an
important means of minimising the emergence of
surplus labour, particularly amongst non-indigenous
groups.
Population density in Sarawak is very low (approxi-
mately 10 persons per square kilometre), but the
proportion of cultivable land is much smaller than in
the case of Sabah. However, to a greater extent, the
Sarawak economy is still dominated by smaliholding
agriculture, producing mainly for subsistence. In 1980
61 per cent of the working population was in the
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing sectors and
59 per cent were own-account and unpaid family
workers. The pace of recent change has been rapid (10
years earlier these agricultural sectors had accounted
for 68 per cent and own-account and family workers
for 73 per cent of the workforce) but Sarawak is clearly
still in an early stage of transition from a
peasant/subsistence to a capitalist economy.
Returns to smallholding are not high but they still
seem to be high enough to push the supply price of
labour to agricultural estates and land schemes above
what they can afford to pay. In contrast to Sabah, the
estates sector in Sarawak is at present very small,
consisting of only 15 estates and 24 land schemes, with
a total of less than 19,000 hectares in production of
rubber, oil palm, cocoa and (on a tiny experimental
scale) tea. Private estates, employing only 1,200 people
in 1984, with an average basic wage of M$199 per
month for agricultural workers (plus some non-cash
benefits such as housing) can only attract about one
third of the local agricultural workers that they need.
Public sector estates and land schemes (where wages
are much better) report to have only about half the
labour that they need.
The extent to which expansion of public-sector
employment has aggravated labour shortage is
probably less in Sarawak than in the two neighbouring
territories. At around 67,000 in 1984 total employment
in the public sector was equivalent to 32 per cent of
formal-sector employment and 13 per cent of the
labour force. Thus the weight of the public sector in
the labour market is much lower than in Brunei and
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Sabah. As in Sabah, also, federal determination of
salary scales has probably meant that public-sector
remuneration has risen more slowly than if local
factors had been the dominant influence. As a result (if
age and eduation are controlled for) average monthly
wage earnings in the private sector are considerably
higher than in the public sector and there is no
evidence of government being regarded as a wage
leader in the labour market.
The extent of underutilisation of labour (coexisting
with shortage) also seems to be less than in the
neighbouring territories. The 'active' unemployment
('not working' and 'seeking work') rate is, at 1.4 per
cent in 1980, even lower than in Sabah. If the 'inactive'
unemployment of those not working but not actively
seeking work is added in, the rate rises, but only to
5.4 per cent, again much lower than in Sabah. 'Search'
unemployment among young school-leavers is
important; more than half of the state's unemployed
have never worked before, almost half have been
unemployed for less than three months and 31 per cent
have at least some secondary schooling. The
unschooled unemployed (42 per cent of the total) tend
to be older and predominantly female. Female
unemployment (particularly inactive unemployment)
rates are much higher than those for males; in
addition, the female participation rate (though still
high at 51 per cent in 1980) has been falling, which
might signify a withdrawal from the labour force of
women unable to get suitable jobs. The existence of
mismatches is indicated by the fact that 42 per cent of
unplaced registrants on the Manpower Department
registers at the end of 1983 were looking for clerical
jobs, which represent less than 16 per cent of wage
employment.
A further complication in the analysis of Sarawak's
labour market is the large number of its workers who
are working outside the state, not only in Brunei,
Singapore, West Malaysia and Sabah, but also in the
Arab region, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia,
Venezuela and the North Sea [Kedit 1984]. For
instance, in Brunei alone there were almost 13,000
Sarawakian workers in 1981, representing more than
half of the sultanate's foreign workers. More than
three quarters of them were in the skilled-and-below
production-worker category, with construction
workers predominant. This phenomenon (which has
its origin in the traditional 'rite of passage' of young
males known as bejalait but now probably reflects
economic pressures) shows that while the supply price
of labour to some wage-employing sectors of the
domestic economy is above their demand price, it is
not high in comparison with the demand price of
employers in some other labour-shortage economies.
See Freeman (1955 para 320 ff) for a description of he/a/ui as it used
to be, and Kedit (1984) for a more contemporary account.
Internally, on the other hand, it remains the case that
Sarawak's labour market - in common with those of
Sabah and Brunei - is one in which shortages have
outweighed surpluses of labour.
Policy Options in the Face of Labour Shortage
Faced with a shortage of labour, there are a number of
policy options open to employers and/or their
governments. In what follows, these are briefly
examined.
Increasing Female Participation
Female participation rates have always been high in
Sabah and Sarawak and remain so (43 and 51 per cent
respectively in 1980), largely as a reflection of the
continued importance of agriculture. Women tend to
remain in the agricultural labour force while bringing
up young children. In non-agricultural, Moslem
Brunei the rate is much lower (33 per cent for citizens
in 1981) but has increased very fast in recent years; in
1971 the comparable rate had been only 17 per cent.
Women have indeed represented a reserve which has
increasingly been pulled into the labour force as the
shortage has intensified, and scope for further
increases in their participation rate remains.
Intersectoral Labour Transfer
When the sector within an economy that is hoarding
and underutilising labour is government, the process
of bidding labour away from it to other labour-scarce
sectors requires the cooperation of government. So far
the Brunei government, which employs more than
three quarters of Brunei citizens, has shown no signs of
such restraint. At the top end of its salary scale it
absorbs all those who have received government
scholarships; at the bottom end, thousands of daily-
paid workers appear to be beyond the control of the
establishment department. Its salaries and fringe
benefits (and the processes for increasing them)
appear to be such as to make it extremely difficult for
the private sector to attract local employees.
In Sabah and Sarawak, on the other hand, where there
is more doubt about the extent of underutilisation of
labour in the public sector, the federal government has
cut real recurrent spending since 1983. This is partly
because the fall in prices and volumes of some of its
export commodities have affected government revenue.
But it also reflects its belief that the public sector in
Malaysia is too large by the standards of other
countries and that there are significant inefficiencies
and overstaffing in many departments, and its wish to
see the private sector as the main engine of growth.
Thus the growth in public sector employment is likely
to be restrained in these two states, to the benefit of
labour supply to other sectors of their economies.
(e) Export of Capital
All three economies, in a sense, export capital. As their
contribution to the federation of which they are
members, Sabah and Sarawak export a large part of
the tax revenue obtained from their oil industries; both
state governments retain revenue equivalent to five per
cent of the value of their petroleum output, with the
remaining tax revenue going to the federal authorities.
The export of capital from Brunei to the rest of the
world is massive. The surplus of government revenue
over expenditure at the height of the oil boom in 1981
was more than $6,000 mn, equivalent to 68 per cent of
GDP, and by the end of 1982 overseas assets of the
Brunei government were estimated at $25,000 mn.
Thus, while none of the three territories sees this as a
deliberate strategy to escape the consequences of
labour shortage, the shortage would probably be more
acute (at least in the short term) if these transfers did
not take place.
(d) Importing Labour
Perhaps the only policy measure that has been
deployed explicitly to alleviate labour shortage in all
three territories is the import of cheap labour. This has
proceeded furthest in Brunei, where immigrant
workers represented 36 per cent of total employment
in 1981. There, the vast majority of foreign workers
are in skilled and below-skilled occupations, with only
14 per cent of them holding professional/technical/
managerial jobs. Ironically more than half of foreign
workers come from Sarawak (a cheap-labour area in
relation to Brunei) which accounts for particularly
high proportions of immigrant construction workers.
Sabah, too, is heavily reliant on immigrant workers,
especially in its agricultural estates. According to the
population census, there were 87,000 non-Malaysian
workers in the state in 1980, about a quarter of the
total working population. This figure is probably an
underestimate, yet it represents a substantial increase
since the early 1970s. 43,000 of the non-Malaysians
enumerated in the census were in agricultural
occupations. The other main occupational con-
centration of foreign workers was the 4,000 (mainly
Filipino) bricklayers, carpenters and other building
workers, 41 per cent of the total number of workers in
these occupations. Only 1,500 non-Malaysian pro-
fessional, technical and managerial workers were
enumerated, seven per cent of all workers in these
categories and two per cent of all immigrant workers.
Sarawak is poised to move along the path already
trodden by Brunei and Sabah, being as yet potentially
rather than actually reliant on immigrant workers.
According to the population census there were less
than 5,400 non-Malaysian workers in the state in 1980,
not much more than one per cent of the total working
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population. Well over half of these were agricultural
workers, while production workers, particularly in the
construction industry, accounted for a further 20 per
cent. There were fewer than a thousand foreign
professional, technical and managerial workers (less
than four per cent of the total number of workers in
these categories). A relatively large number of
Malaysians from outside Sarawak are also working in
the state (3,900 in all), three-quarters of them in the
public sector and 60 per cent of them as teachers.
Thus it appears that in a normal year the number of
non-Sarawakian workers in the state is more than
counterbalanced by the large number of Sarawakians
working outside (see above). However, not all years
are normal. In 1981, for instance, at the height of a
major development scheme in the town of Bintulu,
5,800 work passes were issued to South Korean
building workers, all of whom have since returned
home. Moreover, plans are under consideration for a
spectacular expansion of the agricultural estates
sector. At present this is tiny, employing no more than
6,500 workers in private and public estates and land
schemes in 1984. There is a possibility that such
employment might be tripled by 1994 and might
exceed 37,000 by the end of the century. The
difficulties of attracting local workers to the estates
have already been discussed. If such expansion
occurred it would have to be based very largely on
immigrant labour. This would not raise the state's
dependence on foreign workers to Brunei/Sabah
proportions but it might mean an increase in their
percentage of the working population from one to
five per cent by the year 2000.
The possible impact of extensive use of immigrant
labour (on a Brunei/Sabah scale) can be illustrated
with the aid of our previous diagram. If in Figure 4 the
supply curve for local workers remains as MSD and the
employers' demand curve remains unchanged at ED,
the impact upon the domestic wage and employment
situation of importing workers depends on their
number and their supply price.
The unlimited supply curve for foreign labour, FV,
indicates a supply-price for foreign labour, 0F, which
is less than the minimum supply price for domestic
labour, 0M. As before, with no importation of labour
the economy faces a labour shortage, with employment
stable at 0L1, and at a real wage level of 0W. As
importation of labour begins, the total supply curve
(So + SF) moves outwards, increasing total employ-
ment with, initially, no impact upon the level of the
real wage 0W. It can be seen that L1L3 units of foreign
labour can be employed without reducing either the
level of citizen labour 0L or the wage 0W.
However, importation of labour beyond L1L3 begins
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Figure 4
The Impact of Importing Workers into a Labour
Shortage Economy
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to reduce both the levels of citizen employment and
real wages. For example, at an employment level of
0L4 the wage would fall to 0M, and citizen
employment would be reduced from 0L1 to 0L0, with
L0L4 foreign workers being employed. Beyond this
point, no citizen workers would be employed, and the
wage would fall to 0F.
This is a fairly accurate illustration of the current state
of the market for agricultural wage workers in the case
of Sabah, which operates a virtual open-door
immigration policy as far as less skilled workers are
concerned. For instance, Indonesians recruited by
employers, directly or through middlemen, are issued
with work-passes which are transferable to any
employer. Filipinos classified as refugees have the
right not to be deported. There is also a significant
amount of illegal immigration. Thus the number of
Sabahan workers on the estates has been reduced to
near zero. Those who are unwilling to work at
'immigrant' wages have taken employment in other
sectors of the economy or (the ultimate support of the
supply price 0M) have remained in or reverted to
smallholding.
Employers in the estates sector would argue (probably
correctly) that importing labour is the only way to
earn adequate profits in an unfriendly world market,
given existing techniques of production. As Figure 4
shows, profit with an entirely immigrant labour force
(EVF) is larger than with an entirely indigenous one
(ETW).
(e) Labour-saving Technical Change
However, there is another option - the introduction
of labour saving techniques. Diagrammatically this
would have the effect of changing the slope and shape
of the demand curve. In Figure 4, for example, it might
imply a move outwards and upwards from ET to E1T
with some reduction or even elimination of the
'kinked' portion of the curve owing to increased
capitalisation of the production process. This would
allow the profitable employment of a smaller, entirely
local, high productivity labour force at a wage that
was in line with the supply price.
In practice, planters in Sabah are, as might be
expected, sceptical about the scope for such changes in
technique. There seem to be variations from crop to
crop. For instance, the Palm Oil Research Institute,
Malaysia, has sponsored research into labour-saving
possibilities, and already spraying equipment and
technique have changed from high-volume to ultra-
low-volume; further advances look possible in aerial
and other mechanical applications of fertiliser and
chemicals; harvesting and planting have so far defied
mechanisation, but the research continues. In the case
of rubber, clearing and planting are mechanisable; the
Rubber Research Institute is working on the
mechanisation of tapping but with little success so far.
Labour-saving technical change in cocoa estates
would involve wholesale replanting and redesign of
layouts, but is possible in principle. In general,
mechanisation would involve overhauling plantation
systems, to suit the crop to the machine, rather than
incremental change in existing systems - and the
problem is that there is no incentive for employers to
embark on such an upheaval, as long as they are
assured of a continued adequate supply of cheap
Indonesian labour.
In the absence of labour-saving technical change the
effect of denying employers access to cheap imported
labour would probably be (at current world
commodity prices and exchange rates) the closure of
most agricultural estates and the transfer of their land
to another use compatible with higher wage labour.
Whether this was of net benefit or cost to society
would depend on a variety of factors, including a
comparison of the profitability of with-migration
agriculture and the without-migration alternative, and
of the use to which profits would be put in each case
(for instance, how much is expatriated or used in
non-productive ways, how much taxed and/or
reinvested locally?). In any such comparison the
fundamental long-run question would be whether the
import of cheap labour was preserving the economy's
comparative advantage in a low-productivity, low-
technology sector with limited growth potential and
thus preventing the structural change that would
otherwise occur in the face of labour shortage.
A final point that needs to be emphasised in any
appraisal of the strategy options open to a labour-
shortage economy concerns the viewpoint from which
that appraisal is being made. So far the point of view
adopted has been that of the labour-importing society
and economy. Clearly within such a society there are
different interests that would be differently affected by
the import of cheap labour. This has been implicitly
recognised in our discussion of its impact on wages
and profits. For example, in Figure 4, importation of
L1L3 foreign workers will increase both output and
total employment without sacrificing the levels of
either citizen employment or the real wage. Beyond
L1L3, however, this situation is reversed as both the
wage and citizen employment levels begin to fall. This
result would normally offend domestic policy
objectives, even though levels of output, profitability
and total employment continue to rise. Thus, an
appraisal of policy benefits based upon maximising
world or regional welfare would come to different
conclusions from one based entirely on national (or
territorial) considerations.
Labour shortage economies exist in a world of surplus
labour. For every Brunei or Sabah there is an
Indonesia or Philippines. Migration of labour from
low-wage to high-wage economies is in the short-run
interests of supplier states, virtually by definition.
Thus, expansion of agricultural estates in Sabah and
Sarawak and a continued public-sector 'pension for
life' for all Brunei citizens would undoubtedly be
welcomed by those in neighbouring South East Asian
countries who would be offered the chance of an
escape from wretched poverty. However, this paper
has shown that if the domestic labour market is non-
segmented, such a strategy is compatible with the
likely wage and employment objectives of importing
states only under special circumstances, and for a
fairly tightly defined quantity of imported labour.
Thus, in some economies, the extent to which
production adjustment can occur following an oil-
boom, is highly constrained by the political
implications of labour importation, and by the effects
such a strategy is allowed to have upon levels of
citizens' renumeration.
References
Freeman, J. D., 1955, Report on the Iban of Sarawak, Govern-
ment Printing Office, Kuching
Kedit, P. M., 1984, 'Bejalai is changing Iban society',
Sarawak Gazette, Kuching, April
55
Sen, A. K., 1975, Employment, Technology and Development. Lewis, W. A., 1954, 'Economic development with unlimited
Oxford University Press supplies of labour', The Manchester School
56
